TEXT - Key extracts of IAEA report on Iran nuclear sector
Date: 09-Jun-03
Country: AUSTRIA
Iran has failed to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear material, the subsequent processing and use of that material and the declaration of facilities where the material was stored and processed. These failures, and the actions taken thus far to correct them, can be summarized as follows:
(a) Failure to declare the import of natural uranium in 1991, and its subsequent transfer for further processing.
(b) Failure to declare the activities involving the subsequent processing and use of the imported natural uranium, including the production and loss of nuclear material, where appropriate, and the production and transfer of waste resulting therefrom. Iran has acknowledged the production of uranium metal, uranyl nitrate, ammonium uranyl carbonate, UO2 pellets and uranium wastes.
(c) Failure to declare the facilities where such material (including the waste) was received, stored and processed.
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Although the quantities of nuclear material involved have not been large (the total amount of material, approximately 1.8 tonnes, is 0.13 effective kilograms of uranium. This is, however, not insignificant in terms of a state's ability to conduct nuclear research and development activities) and the material would need further processing before being suitable for use as the fissile material component of a nuclear explosive device, the number of failures by Iran to report the material, facilities and activities in question in a timely manner as it is obliged to do pursuant to its Safeguards Agreement is a matter of concern. While these failures are in the process of being rectified by Iran, the process of verifying the correctness and completeness of the Iranian declarations is still ongoing. The Agency is continuing to pursue the open questions, including through:
(a) The completion of a more thorough expert analysis of the research and development carried out by Iran in the establishment of its enrichment capabilities. This will require the submission by Iran of a complete chronology of its centrifuge and laser enrichment efforts, including, in particular, a description of all research and development activities carried out prior to the construction of the Natanz facilities. As agreed to by Iran, this process will also involve discussions in Iran between Iranian authorities and Agency enrichment experts on Iran's enrichment programme, and visits by the Agency experts to the facilities under construction at Natanz and other relevant locations.
(b) Further follow-up on information regarding allegations about undeclared enrichment of nuclear material, including, in particular, at the Kalaye Electric Company. This will require permission for the Agency to carry out environmental sampling at the workshop located there.
(c) Further enquiries about the role of uranium metal in Iran's nuclear fuel cycle.
(d) Further enquiries about Iran's programme related to the use of heavy water, including heavy water production and heavy water reactor design and construction.
The Director General has repeatedly encouraged Iran to conclude an Additional Protocol. Without such protocols in force, the Agency's ability to provide credible assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear activities is limited. This is particularly the case for states, like Iran, with extensive nuclear activities and advanced fuel cycle technologies.
